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PII BACKGROUND
Where Do Existing PII Tools Look for  
Sensitive Data?
PII tools typically search through the directory tree, 
looking at the content of allocated files, e-mail and 
the like for keywords or strings that indicate the 
file needs further investigation. For example, the 
tools might search for files that contain strings of 
16 digits that could represent a credit card number. 
The strength of current PII tools is to quickly find 
possible PII in locations in which data are visible 
to the operating system. However, they do not 
provide support for searching data outside of these 
traditional areas. For example, if a file containing 
the same string of 16 digits had been deleted, 
the current PII tools would not find the file even 
though it may be recoverable. Deleted files are 
considered unallocated and are not available to 
view by PII tools.
Where Else Can Information Reside and Hide?
Data can reside in places that the operating 
system can see as well as places that are invisible 
to it. Most of these nontraditional locations are 
completely overlooked by PII tools but can still 
harbor sensitive information. Some examples of 
these areas include:
• Metadata—Metadata contains file information 
about the actual data in the file. Metadata can 
include who created the information, what the 
information is about, when the file was created/
modified/accessed, and other information that 
can describe particulars about the data file. 
Metadata can provide a place for sensitive 
data to reside, but it is not particularly easy to 
remove.
• Recycle bin and unallocated space—When a file 
is deleted in a Windows machine, for example, 
the file appears in the recycle bin. The complete 
path and file name are stored in a hidden file 
called INFO2 in the recycled or recycler folder. 
Identity theft has become more prevalent in 
recent years; about 10 million incidents occur 
each year.1 IT professionals must understand 
the need for personally identifiable information 
(PII) discovery to protect themselves and their 
company from the civil, legal and financial 
liabilities caused by data loss. As documents 
migrate to digital form from hard copy, sensitive 
personal information gets stored in a variety of 
places digitally. National and international laws 
are in place requiring companies to search for 
confidential data to ensure compliance. Some 
US examples include the Family Educational 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). At the state level in the US, New 
York State’s Disposal of Personal Records Law 
(2006) requires businesses to “properly dispose 
of records containing personal information,” 
implying that this information must be unreadable 
and unrecoverable. International privacy laws, 
many of which are more stringent than those in 
the US, require similar activity.2 
To comply with these laws, security 
professionals use a variety of sensitive 
information discovery tools to find and remove 
readily available information stored on end-point 
devices. While current PII discovery tools can 
find information that is readily available, they are 
not capable of discovering information that has 
been encrypted, obfuscated, hidden, deleted or is 
otherwise unrecoverable. It is critical to note that 
the content and metadata of deleted files can be 
easily recovered using standard forensics tools. 
This paper will introduce computer forensics 
techniques to reveal sensitive data that are likely 
to be missed by PII tools, including data in RAM 
memory, graphics files, registry information or 
files marked as deleted. 
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After emptying the recycle bin, the corresponding entries in 
INFO2 are also deleted. However, when the file is removed 
from the recycle bin, the system simply marks the space 
previously occupied by this file to be “available for use.” 
Metadata information as well as the original contents of the 
file remain on the hard drive, completely intact until the 
space is allocated to new files and the original information is 
overwritten with new data. As storage becomes less expensive 
and hard drives increase in size, deleted files are likely to 
remain in unallocated space longer. 
• Alternate data streams3—Microsoft’s New Technology 
File System (NTFS) uses “streams” to store file content. 
A stream is a link to a data storage location. NTFS allows 
multiple streams of data to be associated with a file but only 
the default (main) stream is normally displayed to the user. 
One could hide sensitive data in any number of alternate 
streams associated with a host file with no apparent changes 
to the host file. 
• Files with modified extensions—File extensions are the 
characters following the dot in a filename, e.g., text.txt. 
They indicate a file’s data type but can easily be changed 
by the user. Each file also has a file header that uniquely 
identifies the file type. Adversaries often attempt to disguise 
the true nature of a file by changing the file’s extension. 
Such changes can make it difficult for PII detection tools to 
find sensitive information in a file. 
• Graphics and images—Pictures, images and graphics can 
contain information that may be considered private or 
sensitive. For example, a screen capture of a spreadsheet 
page with account or other character-based information will 
not be read as a character-based file.
• Print spool files—Printing involves a spooling process. For 
a print job, the file’s content is written to a spool file (.SPL) 
and a separate graphics file (.EMF) for each page. These 
Print Spool files are saved to disk until the print is done and 
then deleted. 
• Link or shortcut files—Link files are shortcuts pointing to 
the actual files that allow users to launch programs, open 
files and folders, or connect to a URL. They contain path 
information to allow the operating system to navigate to the 
location of the actual data file.
• RAM and page files—Some sensitive information may be 
found only from the computer’s RAM and in its page files. 
At other times, such data will be written to disk if a machine 
is suspended or hibernated. 
• E-mail—E-mail, instant messages and other communication 
traffic can contain sensitive information.
• Registry hive—The Windows registry contains settings 
specific to the hardware, applications, services, security and 
users on the system. Much potentially valuable information 
is stored there. Such information includes user and group 
identities and passwords and Internet history, including 
cookies and records of queries such as searches and lists of 
recently accessed files.
PII TOOLS AND FINDINGS 
Existing PII tools
Both open source and commercial products are available 
to assist in detecting sensitive data on digital media. Some 
examples include:
• Find_SSN
• Sensitive Number Finder (SENF) 
• Spider
• Identity Finder 
Find_SSN is a simple-to-use Windows application. 
Developed by Virginia Tech, Find_SSN searches for files 
that may contain data matching the known patterns of 
Social Security numbers. Find_SSN does not scan PDF 
and Microsoft Outlook PST files, and files larger than 100 
megabytes. SENF is a tool written by the information security 
group at the University of Texas at Austin. It has similar 
search capabilities as Find_SSN. Cornell University’s Spider 
is an open source, more sophisticated scanning tool that can 
scan archives, documents and spreadsheets after selecting 
a target directory. However, Spider does not scan PDF and 
Microsoft Outlook PST files. Identity Finder is a commercial 
search tool capable of locating and identifying personal 
information (such as Social Security, credit card and bank 
account numbers as well as passwords or dates of birth) in 
files, e-mail, databases, registry entries and web browser 
caches. However, even with Identity Finder, there are still 
many areas not in its search path. 
Testing the PII tools
To test the limits of the existing PII tools, a variety of files 
were created including .pdf, .xls, .doc, .txt and archive files on 
a USB drive. Two of these files were deleted to test whether 
the tools search for deleted files in unallocated space. The 
file text.txt was also renamed to text.jpg to test whether the 
tools are capable of detecting sensitive data from a file with 
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its extension modified. A file was also created that did not 
contain Social Security numbers in its main content, but had 
these data hidden in an alternate data stream. Note that none 
of the deleted files had been overwritten. 
In addition, the tools were run against a live Windows 
machine so they could interrogate files that could not be 
stored on the USB drive, such as deleted Microsoft Outlook 
(*.pst) files, the Windows registry, alternate data streams, files 
in the recycle bin, print spool files and RAM data.
To interrogate files from the USB test drive, each tool was 
directed to run against the drive image and the results were 
recorded. For other files not stored on the drive, the tool was 
directed to the location on the hard drive where those files 
would normally reside. All the test files are listed in figure 1. 
Results From Running These Tools
The Find_SSN, SENF and Spider tools discovered only a 
limited subset of the conditions presented. Identity Finder, 
on the other hand, improved on the capability to identify PII 
when compared to the other PII tools tested. Identity Finder 
not only detected all of the conditions found with the other 
tools, but also discovered PII in renamed files, PDFs, registry 
entries and .pst files. However, all of these tools still had 
limited capability to detect sensitive information stored in 
metadata, alternate data streams, graphics files, printer spools, 
RAM and page files. Additionally, none of the tools could 
identify PII that exists in unallocated space (if the recycle bin 
has been emptied, for example) even though the PII remains 
intact on the disk. All of these areas represent potential data 
leakage areas for the current PII tools.
A summary of the results is shown in figure 1.
Limitations of PII Tools
The current PII identification tools search for sensitive data—
either through user-specified directories or starting at the 
root directory. They are not designed to find information that 
has been obfuscated, encrypted, deleted or otherwise hidden. 
Figure 1 shows that PII identification tools miss finding 
information in areas including unallocated space (i.e., deleted 
files that can be recovered), e-mail and deleted e-mail, files 
open and locked or auto-saved by other processes, system 
files (executables, DLLs, hibernation files), the Windows 
registry, application-specific database files, memory and page 
files, metadata, graphics files (screenshots, thumbnails, RPM, 
TIFF, JPG, EMF, etc.), intentionally hidden PII in digital 
data (digital steganography, for example), as well as links 
or indirect references to PII. These limitations may lead to 
inaccurate results with false positives and false negatives. 
FORENSICS TOOLS AND FINDINGS
As mentioned previously, the current existing PII 
identification tools search only within the file system and are 
not capable of detecting information in deleted files, or from 
any location not normally accessible to a nonprivileged user. 
Modern forensic tools can help to bridge this gap. Forensic 
tools are designed to recover and analyze data that has been 
intentionally or unintentionally deleted or otherwise hidden. 
Originally, this class of tools was associated with activities 
in the law enforcement sector and was used exclusively to 
discover legal evidence. Recently, they have been seen widely 
used in business and corporate environments.
Forensic tools are capable of bypassing the limits imposed 
by the operating system and can find file content that has 
been deleted (i.e., no longer available to the operating system) 
or has been stored in a place not typically accessible to a user, 
such as RAM or the registry. They can display files stored in 
a variety of formats, allowing a knowledgeable user to find 
information that would otherwise appear to be inaccessible.
While forensic tools’ strength is their capability to search 
nontraditional areas in which data can be hidden, their 
weakness is that they can be time-consuming as they search so 
much more of the system than PII tools.
Existing Forensics Tools
While many forensics tools may be capable of detecting PII, 
two commercial forensics tools, Forensic Toolkit (FTK)4 and 
EnCase,5 were studied.6
Both EnCase and FTK run on Windows and provide 
sophisticated digital evidence analysis functions such as 
recovering deleted files, keyword and regular-expression 
searching, registry viewing, e-mail and memory analysis, and 
much more. The popular, versatile and free forensics tool the 
Sleuth Kit (TSK) with an advanced interface, PTK,7  can also 
perform most of the same tasks. These tools can be used on 
offline as well as running systems. 
Finding PII Using Forensics Tools
The forensic tools were applied to interrogate the same 
dataset tested by the PII tools. The results were then 
incorporated into figure 1. 
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Figure 1—Test Files and the Results
File Name Description of the file FindSSN Spider SENF
Identity 
Finder FTK EnCase






SSN test file.pdf A PDF file containing Social Security numbers No No No FOUND Viewable * Viewable*
Text.jpg A text.txt file, renamed to a JPEG file No No No FOUND FOUND FOUND




PowerPoint slides FOUND No No FOUND FOUND FOUND
Word document with Social Security numbers in 
content
FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND
Word document with Social Security numbers in 
summary (metadata)
No No No No FOUND FOUND
It was printed to generate a print spool file (*.emf) No No No FOUND Viewable * Viewable*
Deleted Social Security numbers test file No No No No FOUND FOUND
ScreenShotWithSSN.png A screen shot containing Social Security numbers No No No No Viewable * Viewable*
textFileCyptoClass.rtf RTF FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND
Text.txt Text file FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND
Text-deleted.txt Deleted text file (after recycle bin emptied) No No No No FOUND FOUND
PII test.zip Zip file containing text.txt and Social Security 
number test file.docx
FOUND FOUND No FOUND FOUND FOUND




deleted pst file Outlook file with e-mail deleted No No No No FOUND FOUND
File with SSN in alternate 
stream
Word document with Social Security numbers in 
alternate data stream
No No No No FOUND FOUND
File in recycle bin File deleted but recycle bin not emptied FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND FOUND
RAM and page files Contents of memory with Social Security numbers 
in memory
No No No Unknown FOUND FOUND
Windows registry PII written to Windows registry No No No FOUND FOUND FOUND
* While the tools are not capable of searching these files directly, they allow display of the enclosed image using gallery view.
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Both Encase and FTK offer live and static data search 
functions that support pattern matching using regular 
expressions. For example, a search might be conducted to 
identify files containing Social Security numbers using the 
pattern:  <\d\d\d[\- ]?\d\d[\- ]?\d\d\d\d\> (where \d represents 
a “digit”). Using this search, the forensic tools discovered 
Social Security numbers from all deleted files, the signature 
mismatch file, the ppt file, RAM and page file, e-mail including 
deleted e-mail, link files, and registry hives. Data that had been 
hidden in the alternate data stream were revealed as well as 
the PII stored in the metadata of the file. These are not trivial 
differences. A file containing PII in its metadata would not be 
discovered by any of the previously discussed PII tools, since 
they focus only on file content. Using a process called signature 
analysis, the PII hidden in a file with its file extension changed 
from .txt to .jpg is also easily discovered by the forensics tools. 
The signature analysis process identifies and corrects the 
changed extension by comparing the file extension with header 
information stored in a file.
Even though the powerful live search reveals many results 
that were missed by the PII identification tools, the sensitive 
information hidden in graphics files, a print spool file and a 
PDF file were not detected by live search. The authors also 
utilized other technologies (built into the forensic tools) to 
uncover the rest of the PII information:
• Graphics files—To identify sensitive information hidden 
in graphics files, the authors used the Gallery/Graphics 
View feature. By clicking the Graphics/Gallery View tab, 
all graphic formats including EMF, BMP, TIFF, JPEG, PNG 
and GIF are displayed. The operator can then view the  
files to make a determination about the sensitivity of the 
image content. 
 
It may be possible to convert image files to text using optical 
character recognition (OCR) techniques. Regular-expression 
searches can then be employed to search for strings in the 
resulting files. This capability is not currently a feature of 
for-free or for-pay forensic tools, but such capabilities could 
improve PII scanning exercises as well as the forensics tools.
• Print spool files—Forensics tools support data carving that 
allows an investigator to search for EMF, GIF, JPEG, PDF, 
HTML and MS Office document files embedded in other 
files or unallocated space. This feature can recover deleted 
files embedded in unallocated space as well as the EMF 
files embedded in print spool files. Even though the EMF 
files are deleted after the print is done, forensics tools are 
capable of recovering deleted EMF files from unallocated 
space. Once the EMF file content has been recovered, the 
information is then viewable using the forensics Graphics 
View feature described previously.
• PDF files—Regular-expression live search does not support 
searching for PDF files. PDF files must be converted to 
text using OCR techniques for the live search. For this 
research, the authors viewed all PDF files via EnCase/FTK’s 
Transcript/Native View tab. This is not a viable solution if 
there are many PDF files to be searched. Deleted PDF files 
can be recovered using the data carving feature. 
In summary, using the forensic tools, all of the traditional 
locations for PII, as well as many areas in which PII could 
be intentionally or inadvertently hidden, can be searched. 
Forensics tools can add significantly to the results provided by 
PII tools. 
CONCLUSIONS
A fundamental strength of forensics tools when used for 
detecting sensitive information is that they can recover deleted 
files and embedded images, list all alternate streams for each 
file, and perform signature analysis before conducting a search 
for sensitive information. A search using forensics tools not only 
checks the file content, but also examines file slack, metadata, 
links and other content. As a result, forensics tools are capable 
of discovering more information than the PII detection tools 
that were evaluated. They provide an additional source of 
information by which a PII search can become more effective 
and uncover more potential sources of PII.
However, there is no single tool capable of effectively 
finding all PII. Each of the tools has its strengths and 
weaknesses. This article was intended to address data that are 
likely to be missed by currently available PII tools. Forensics 
tools can be a powerful addition to the auditor’s toolbox, 
providing additional capabilities to reveal sensitive data. If 
an auditor uses only PII tools, it is possible that sensitive 
recoverable information will be overlooked. 
Organizations concerned about unauthorized 
dissemination of sensitive information should be aware 
of the limitations of their current PII tools and use this 
knowledge to make decisions about potential data leakage or 
compromise. Otherwise, it might be interpreted as a failure 
to adhere to privacy laws or regulations that could subject the 
organizations to legal liability or negative publicity. 
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